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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
History of Merger Activity
The United States is undergoing a merger wave of
giant proportions.

The current merger wave began in 1948

and has continued unabated for over twenty years.

Data on

mergers and acquisitions (see Table 1) denotes that American
business is characterized by the appetite corporate manage
ments have for absorbing other companies.

The data in

Table 1 are indicated by the increase in merger activity
during the last two decades.

From 1950 to 1959 there were

a total of 4,789 mergers and from i960 to I969 this figure
increased to 12,579 total mergers.
In the most recent year, for which complete data
are available (I969), there were a total of 2,246 mergers
in the manufacturing and mining sectors, which involved an
exchange of $10.6 billion in assets.^ For the period 19481969, acquired assets in manufacturing and mining totaled
$63.7 billion.^

In terms of either the number of firms dis

appearing or the size of the assets changing ownership, the
U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Current Trends in
Merger Activity. 1969. Table 2 and Table 11 (Washington,
D.C.i Government Printing Office), p. 16 (hereafter abbrevi
ated FTC, Report).

TABLE 1
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS--MANUPACTURING AND
MINING CONCERNS ACQUIRED# 1950-1970

Years Mergers
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

8#
954
853
861
854
1,008
995
1,496
2,407
2,307
1,344**

Mergers
62
55
73
71
90
90
98
167
206
152
88**

Number
Horizontal
& Vertical Conglomerate
Mergers
Mergers
19
23
25
22
30
27
22
28
33
29
9^^

43
32
48
49
60
63
76
139
173
123
79*^

Assets ($ Millionsy
Horizontal
& Vertical Conglomerate
TotedL^
Mergers
Assets
Mergers
$
566
$ 1,689
2,056
805
2,290
1.051
2,984
1.187
2,736
' 974
769
3.835
629
4,153
9,090
1.596
1.504
13.311
11,036
2.990
5.447**
1.073**

$ 1.122
1.251
1.240
1.796
1.762
3.068
3.525
7.493
11.807
8.045
4.375**

SOURCE# U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstracts of the United States# 1971. (Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office,
1971), p. 474.
NOTE# Total limited to actions.reported by Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
and Standard and Poor's Corporation. Many smaller acquisitions are not reported in
these sources. Includes partial acquisitions when they comprise whole divisions of
other companies.
♦Includes all concqms with assets of $10 million and over.
♦♦Preliminary.

to
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post-World War II merger movement is the largest one in
United States history*
The first merger wave in the United States occurred
between 1698 and 1902.^ During this short period of time,
mergers
• • • transformed many industries, formerly char
acterised by many small and medium-sised firms,
into those in which one or a very few large enter
prises occupied leading positions. It laid the
foundation for the industrial structure that has
characterised most^pf American industry into the
twentieth century.
In terms of sise, however, this was the smallest of the
merger waves with a total of 2,653 reported mergers in manu
facturing and mining, accounting for an exchange of assets
of $6.3 billlon.3
The second merger wave took place between 1926 and
1938.*

In terms of magnitude, this was the second largest

of the three merger waves with 5,846 reported mergers during
the period.^

In terms of capitalisations, the small amount

of available evidence indicates that this merger wave was
8
larger than the tum-of-the-century wave.
In terms of
^Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American
Industry. 1895-1956. (Princetoni Princeton UniversityPress,
1959). p. 5.
*ibid.

%«unuel R. Reid, Mergers. Managers mid the Economy.
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19o8), p. 38.
Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 5*
^Reid, Mergers. Managers. p. 38.
®Ibid.

k
importance# however» this merger movement did not have the
effect on industrial concentration as did the first merger
wave.

The late 1920's movement has generally been thought

of as an attempt "• • .to restore the industrial concentra
tion which heul become diluted over the years,
The third merger movement had its beginning in the
1950s.

The period from the early 1950s to the 1960s» how

ever» was a rather dormant period as far as acquisitions
were concerned.

Then» in the mid-1960s» expansion by merger

negotiation became a popular management policy.

The present

merger wave differs from its predecessors not so much in
magnitude (when inflation and business population are taken
into account) but rather in the type of merger activity that
is being pursued.

As indicated in Table 1» for the last two

decades mergers have been growing at an increasing rate
until only the last several years when merger activity has
started to decrease.
The first two merger waves were attempts to mono
polize markets by either acquiring a significant number of
one's competitors and/or the precluding of new entry by
acquiring the producers of inputs of very inelastic supply.
The present merger wave is dominated by mergers of the con
glomerate variety.

These firms neither compete in the same

output markets nor are they related in either's input market.

^Nelson» Merger Movements, p. 5*

For example» of all the large mergers^^ which took place in
manufacturing and mining in the 1948-1969 period» 66.7 per
cent of them (representing 65.1 per cent of the acquired
assets) were of the conglomerate type.^^ Although horizon
tal and vertical mergers are no longer dominant types of
acquisitions» the number of such mergers and the amount of
assets involved is still very large when compared to either
of the first two merger waves.
In the legal sense» a merger involves the combina
tion of two or more firms» with one of the former independent
firms remaining as the surviving entity.

The Federal Trade

Commission's definition of a merger includes
. . . only those purchases or transfers of ownership
of a company (or division of a company) that repre
sent a merger of two companies previously under
separate control • . • the purchase of stock not
leading to a majority ownership interest is excluded.
More specifically» the occurrence of a merger can be defined
as a combination of two or more previously independent busi
ness enterprises into a single enterprise under the control
of a single management.

This can occur where (1) a company

acquires all the assets of another company » (2) a company
acquires more than $0 per cent of the equity securities of
10

A leirge merger is defined by the Federal Trade
Commission as one in which the acquisition represents assets
of $10 million or more.
^^U.S.» Federal Trade Commission» Large Mergers in
Manufacturing and Mining. 1948-1969, Table 2 (Washington»
D C . : Government Printing Office» 1969)» p. 2,
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another company, or (3) two companies combine to form a
brand new enterprise.

For all intents and purposes, these

forms of combinations can be viewed as being sufficiently
similar to be lumped into the single classification of
*a merger,
Types of Mergers
The volume of merger activity has been subject to
large fluctuations over timet also, the types of mergers
which have been most popular at any given moment have shown
a corresponding diversity.

The object of this section is to

describe the various types of mergers.
It is very common to divide merger activity into
three typest

horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. A

conglomerate

merger is defined as ". ..an acquisitionthat

is neither horizontal nor vertical.**

The horizontal mer

ger dominated the first two merger waves while vertical
mergers accounted for virtually the entire remainder of
total merger

activity in the first two merger waves. In the

early years of the present merger wave

there has been

a

steady shift away from the horizontal and vertical merger
to the conglomerate merger.
^The terms merger, acquisition, and consolidation
shall be used interchangeably. These terms refer to the
absorption of a previously independent business entity (or
a substantial portion thereof) by another business enterprise.
14
U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report
on Corporate Mergers y d Acouisitions (Washington, D.C.;
Government Printing Office, 1955)# P- 50.

7
From 1948 to 19511 horizontal and verticaLl mergers
amounted to 62 per cent of all merger activity, and conglom
erate mergers amounted to 38 per cent of all merger activity.
Merger percentages shifted until in 1968, conglomerate mer
gers amounted to 91 per cent and horizontal and vertical
mergers amounted to 9 per cent of all merger activity
The shift to conglomerate mergers has been attributed to
several factorsi (1) the increase in antitrust and monopoly
legislation activity by Congress,and (2) changes in corporate tax laws over the last several decades. 18
Economists have identified a number of reemons why
firms choose to grow by mergers.

The businessmen's typical

motivations for merging include the desire for such advan
tages as easy market entry, acquisition of new technological
skills or patent rights, procurement of needed managerial
skills, acquiring a listing on a national exchange, the
protection of input and output markets, achieving greater
capital and earnings strength, cyclical and secular stabil
ity, and tax advantages.

^ . S . , Congress, Senate, Report of President Nixon's
Task Force on Productivity and Competition. S. Doc. 98. 91st
Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 6481.

^^John C. Narv.r, Conglomérat. Merger. Mid Market
Competition. (Berkley• University of California Press. 196?)
p. 37.
18

John K. Butters, John Lintner and William L. Carey,
Effects of Taxation: Corporate Mergers. (Cambridge, Mass.t
The Riverside Press, 1951).

8
In analysing merger causes or motives» it is import
ant to recognise that there are two levels of causationt
first» motives for growth i and second » factors which make a
merger a preferred method of growth. 10
^ Firms may wish to
grow for a variety of reasonsi to achieve economies of largescale production or distribution» to attain market power» or
simply to grow larger because doing so increases profits and
the overall prestige of the firm and its management.

20

When a firm has any of the above incentives for
growth» it next must decide upon the most effective (from
its standpoint) way of growings internal expansion or merger.
The merger is often more advantageous for a variety of
reasons. It permits the purchase of personnel» products
and technology.

It may be easier to finance.

Perhaps most

importantly» it permits expanding one's position in an
existing industry or entry into a new one without distrubing
the competitive situation by adding new capacity and a new
competitor to the industry.

21

Because these factors favor

ing mergers are always present» companies which have an
incentive to grow will often find it to their own advantage
to grow by merging.
10

^U.S.» Federal Trade Commission» Concentration
Trends and Merger Activity in U.S. Manufacturing Industries
Since World War II (Washington. D.C.i Government Minting
Office» 1967), p. 7.

^°Ibid., p. 8.

9
Following is a definition and example of each type
of merger and an economic justification or motivation for
its occurrence.
Horizontal Mergers
A merger is horizontal idien the companies involved
produce one or more of the same# or closely related# products
in the same geographic market.

Horizontal growth would in

clude mergers with businesses that were involved in# or
similar to# the acquiring company's basic product. 22

An

example of a horizontal merger would be a television tube
manufacturer acquiring another company which also produces
television tubes.

Another example is a bank acquiring the

bank across the street.
There are several reasons for expanding a business
through a horizontal merger.

First# the company being

acquired could possess strong management talent that the
acquiring company felt would help strengthen the parent
company.

Secondly# the acquiring company could strengthen

its market position# through the application of good management technique# by acquiring a company with weak management. 24
22

Myles L. Mace and George G. Montgomery# Management
Problems of Corporate Acquisitions. (Boston; Graduate School
of Business Administration# Harvard University# 1962)# p. 9.
H. Hennessy# Jr., Acquiring and Merging Busi
nesses. (Englewood Cliffs# New Jersey; Prentice-Hall# Inc.#
1966), p. 7.
2*lbid.

10
A third reason is that a merger sometimes provides the
cheapest way to acquire the assets required for expansion.
Also horizontal mergers are expected to yield economies of
scale in production, management services and promotional
activity.

In addition, it should yield increased market
26
control and concentration. *
Vertical Mergers
A merger is vertical when the two companies had a
buyer-seller relationship prior to the merger.

Vertical

growth is defined as the acquisition of a business which is
a supplier to the acquiring company or a business for which
the acquiri% company is a supplier. 27' A merger between
firms which are in direct line from raw materials to sales
is a vertical merger.

An example of a vertical merger is

the acquisition of a tire manufacturing company .by an auto
mobile manufacturing firm or the acquisition of a retail
clothing chain by a clothing manufacturer.
The main purpose of merging vertically, besides
increased company profits, is to provide the acquiring com
pany with an assured supply of raw materials or to insure a
ready outlet for the product being manufactured.

Management

may or may not be an important factor in merging vertically.

Z^ibid.
26;
Federal Trade Commission, Large Mergers, p. 4.
27Mace and Montgomery, Management Problems, p. 23.

11
depending upon the amount of difference between the two
companies.

Also, vertical mergers are expected to yield
28
economies in purchasing and/or distribution.
Frequently, it becomes difficult to differentiate
between horizontal and vertical mergers because of the
circumstances involved.

For example, a vertical merger

can be in the same related field of electronic equipment
as the acquiring company, making it difficult to classify
the merger as either vertical or horizontal.
Conglomerate Mergers
A conglomerate merger involves the consolidation of
two essentially unrelated firms or the accumulation of
diverse companies under one corporate structure.

In I968,

90 per cent of the mergers involving $11 billion of assets
were associated with conglomerate mergers.

Even though

merger activity has leveled off the last several years, the
conglomerate merger continues to play an important role in
merger activity, accounting for a majority of all mergers
and acquisitions (Table 1).
A conglomerate merger brings together dissimilar
and unrelated firms under the same corporate management.
The product made by the company being acquired would not be
closely related to the primary product of the parent company.

^®FTC, Report, p. 4-5.
^^••Conglomerates Under Attack," Financial World.
March 12, I969, P- 3.

12
An example would be an aerospace company acquiring an ice
cream manufacturer*

The "pure" conglomerate merger affords

little or no opportunity to achieve economies of scale since
it is more analogous to a holding company than to the usual
concept of "the firm." However, conglomerate mergers do
offer the opportunity to lessen risk by a process similar
to portfolio diversification.When two companies are in
related manufacturing fields it sometimes becomes difficult
to distinguish between the vertical merger and the conglomer
ate merger.

In many cases the end product is the only factor

that separates the two mergers.
The Contribution of the Paper
The current merger wave began ten years ago.

The

past thirteen years have seen the third giant merger wave
in U. S. financial history.

The two-year period of I968-

1969 alone brought 10,59^ merger announcements, and they
obviously involved many times that number of p e o p l e . A s
merger activity continues to increase, the impact on the
corporate executive becomes more significant.
According to several current periodicals, the in
crease in merger activity over the past decade has resulted
30PTC, Report, p. 4-5.
^^Richard J. Bolund, "Merger Planning— How Much
Weight Do Personnel Factors Carry?" Personnel. March, 1970,
p. 8.
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in the displacement of many top business executives.

These

displacements were the result of massive transfers or firings
by the acquiring companies# resignations due to frictions#
fears# anxieties# and forced retirements.^^
The reasons for executive displacement have been
identified.

Inferences about the relative importance of

management policy and the type of merger as they influence
executive displacement have been drawn.

Specifically# the

paper is a detailed study of the effects of mergers and
acquisitions upon the top management personnel of companies
being acquired.

A comprehensive examination of the acquisi

tions of Litton Industries# Inc. provides the basis for the
study.
Mergers and acquisitions have played a leading role
in Litton Industries# Inc. growth and in establishing Litton
in the wide array of fields in which it currently does busi
ness.

Litton Industries# Inc. has acquired 97 companies

during the period I958-I969. Of these companies# 20 were
large# each having assets of $10 million or more at the time
of acquisition.Questions concerning the problems that top
management encounters during merger activity and the policies

^^Robert C. Albrook# "The Frustrations of the Acquired
Executive#" Fortune. November# 19&9, p. 152.
33"Merge, Merge— But What About the People?" Newsweek.
September 23» 1968# p. 85.
^ Federal Trade Commission# Economic Report on Cor
porate Mergers. I969# p. 56I.
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of Litton as they relate to the personnel changes involved
in the mergers have been examined.

The questions to which

answers are attempted are#
A.

The personnel problems associated with
merger negotiation.

B.

The extent of executive displacement
involved in the mergers studied.

C.

Type of merger with respect to executive
displacement.
Assumptions and Limitations

The object of this section is to explain how Litton
was selected as a basis for the study and to set forth some
ground rules for conducting the examination of Litton Indus
tries, Inc.
Litton Industries, in its relatively short life of
just over fifteen years as one of the larger conglomerates,
has acquired over a half billion dollars in assets of various
companies.Over 90 per cent of this amount has been acquir
ed since 1961.^* It is clear from the foregoing figures that
mergers and acquisitions have played a leading role in Litton*s
conglomerate.

Acquired assets during the I96I-I968 interval

represented almost one-half of the increase in Litton*s
assets from $119 million in i960 to $1.4 billion on January 31,
1969.

Because of Litton*s tremendous growth during the

1960s, it was selected as being representative of merging

S^ibld., p. 557.

3*Ibld.

3?Ibid., p. 562.

15

companies during the merger active years of I96I-I969, (In
i960 Litton ranked below the 500 largest industrials and by
the end of 1968» Litton had assets of over $1 billion and had
become the 5^th largest manufacturing company in the United
States,

It may be observed in Table 2 that Litton*s acqui

sition pattern was not dominated by large firms.

Rather» 17

firms with over $10 million in assets were acquired.

The

mergers and acquisitions of Litton are broad enough to cover
small, medium» and large firms providing sufficient data upon
which valid conclusions can be made.
The study of Litton*s mergers consists of an exami
nation of the disposition of the top executives of the
acquired companies after the merger.

The term "top executive"

is defined as the chairman of the board of directors and
corporate officers.

The members of the board of directors are

not considered unless they are also officers of the company.
This approach is taken on the assumption that on many occa
sions board members who are not officers of the company tend
to serve only in advisory capacities» therefore their main
employment would not be directly affected by a merger.
The executives of corporations being acquired are
traced for two years after the merger.

It is the assumption

of the study that following a merger the majority of person
nel changes occurring in two years are the direct result of

3*Ibid., p. 557.
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the merger and not due to normal attrition activities.

Any

period of time in excess of two years would start to reveal
some personnel changes due to promotions, normal retirements,
and not to the effects of the merger.

To use a period less

than two years introduces a risk of not allowing enough time
for the merger to result in personnel changes.
The use of a short time period is especially critical
when considering the fact that Poor's Register of Directors
and Executives and Moody's Industrial Manuad. which are the
primary source of data for the study, could possible encount
er a delay in showing the changes in personnel structure of
a company after the merger since they are published on a
yearly basis.

Using two years as a basic time should mini

mize this problem.
The companies examined in Chapters IV and V include
those acquisitions that occurred after Litton became known as
a conglomerate company.

The companies include those acquisi

tions made after the merger with Monroe Calculating Machine
Company in 195&, which was Litton's first major diversifica
tion.

The 26 companies which are studied include all mergers

which were large enough to be considered a significant acqui
sition (see Table 3).

Moody's Industrial Manual and Poor's

Corporate Records define a significant acquisition as being
vdiolly owned by the parent company.

These companies are

listed in Table 3 on the following page and are discussed
in Chapter VI and V.

The significant mergers of Litton are

18

TABLE 3
SELECTED COMPANIES ACQUIRED
BY LITTON, 1958-1969

Year

Acquired Assets
($ Millions)

$50 Million or More
Royal McBee Corp.

1965

$70

$10-$fm Million
Monroe Calculating Machine Co.
Eureka Specialty Printing Co.
Cole Steel Equipment Co.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.
Fitchburg Paper Co.
Hewitt-Robins, Inc.
Stouffer Foods Corp.

1958
1961
1961
1962
1964
1965
1967

25
11
13
16
14
49
35

$5-$9 Million
McKieman-Terry Corp.
Aero Service Corp.
Clifton Precision Pro
ducts Co., Inc.
Alder Electronics, Inc.
Streater Industries, Inc.
McCray Refrigerator Co.
Kester Solder Co.

1962
1962

9
6

1963
1963
1964
1966
1967

7
9
6
8
6

Less Than $5 Million
Maryland Electronic Co.
Westrex Co.
Times Facsimile Corp.
Poly Scientific Corp.
Winchester Electric Co.
Alvey-Ferguson Corp.
Maverick-Clark Co.
Electra Motors Co.
Sturgis Business Equipment Co.
Eureka X-Ray Co.
Chainveyor Corp.

1958
1958
1959
1962
1963
1966
1966
1966
1966
1967
1967

—

-

SOURCE: U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic
Report on Corporate Mergers (Washington, D.C.i Government
Printing Office, I969), p. 56I.
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studied to insure that data presented are comparable.

This

methodology cannot yield definitive statements about the
success or failure of Litton as a conglomerate.

However, it

can identify factors, trends, and patterns involved in the
displacement of top executives when mergers occur.
In view of the fact that horizontal and vertical
mergers are still important, a study which dealt solely with
conglomerate mergers «diile excluding all other types of mer
gers would suffer from a degree of incompleteness.

A study

which focused attention on the total of merger activity, and
ignored the important distinctions between merger types,
could also be criticized for being insufficient.

In prac

tice it is difficult to classify some mergers as being any
one particular type.

In order to simplify the study of

Litton's mergers, types of mergers are combined where they
show certain common characteristics.

Vertical mergers in

clude concentric marketing companies (same customer type as
buying company but different technology) and horizontal
mergers to include concentric technology (same technology
as buying company but different customer type) . Diverse
acquisitions are based upon the original companies make-up
(customers and technology different from that of the buying
company).^®

^^John Hitching, Hfhy Do Mergers Miscarry?** Harvard
Business Review. November-Deeember, 196?, p. 84.
*Olbid.
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Summary
The background of merger activity in the United
States was discussed in Chapter I and the various merger
types that play an integral role in the displacement of
executives during various mergers and acquisitions was set
forth.
The purpose of Chapter II is to provide a background
against which the policies and actions of Litton can be
studied regarding executive displacement, not to provide a
thorough examination of all the problems of management with
respect to mergers.

Chapter II consists of a general discus

sion of the various problems such as fear, anxieties, and
frictions that occur among top management when businesses
are acquired.

An attempt is made to show how these problems

can affect businesses involved in merging and how they differ
according to merger type.

Chapter III presents a background

of Litton Industries in order to illustrate what was the
company's policy toward growth during the 1960s.

In addi

tion, the chapter considers Litton*s management policies
during this period with respect to everyday operations and
to stated policies concerning merger criteria.
Chapters IV and V consist of an examination of the
more important acquisitions of Litton with respect to the
effects of these acquisitions upon top management personnel.
The examination consists of a classification of each merger
type and a determination of the amount of personnel change
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involved for each merger.

The horizontal and vertical mer

gers are discussed in Chapter IV and the conglomerate
mergers are discussed in Chapter V.
Chapter VI consists of a sunmiary of the information
presented in the first four chapters and conclusions are
drawn concerning the study.

No attempt is made to relate

any specific problem to any particular merger.

In deter

mining whether or not Litton overcame the problems listed
in Chapter II, consideration is given to Litton's policies
and conclusions drawn as to their possible affects upon
these problems.

Also, consideration is given to the indirect

evidence offered by the changes which occurred in the person
nel of the companies acquired by Litton in the 1960s.

CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT
WHEN MERGERS OCCUR
The accepted corporate philosophy during the current
merger wave held that the easiest way to increase profit was
to increase sales volume, and the best way to increase sales
volume was to acquire and expand established, companies.^
Unfortunately, many acquisitions were made on the basis of
their balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements, and
insufficient attention was paid to the study and evaluation
2
of the strength and potential of the management group.
The
impact on the corporate executive during this time period
.
^(1960-1969) was significant. At the same time expanding
corporations were searching for qualified management person
nel, executive displacement was rising as a result of cor
porate mergers.
The period from 1950 to i960 was a slow era as far
as mergers are concerned.

But the third of the giant merger

waves in United States financisd history occurred during the
past thirteen years.

Time and experience have matured the

^Richard J. Wytmar, "Merger and the Executive,
Business Horizons. December I969, p. 50.
^Ibid.

22

23
merger movement of today, but despite existing merger poli
cies, executive displacement still occurs.

With the increase

in merger activity over the last decade, there has been an
increase in personnel problems associated with mergers.

The

reasons for executive displacement are varied in nature and
are the result of personnel frictions, feeurs, types of mer
gers, pre-merger evaluation and post-merger integration.
Significance of Fear as a
Factor in Mergers
Executives have become increasingly fearful of dis
placement due to mergers.3 Many acquisitions are followed
quickly by early retirements, resignations, and separation
of key personnel.

iL

It is not uncommon for an executive to

believe that if a merger occurs, there will be wholesale
displacement of personnel.

The fear of displacement is not

without basis, because displacement is the case in many
mergers.

For example, when Norge Corporation was acquired

by Fedders Corporation, 15 top executives and 55 members of
the Norge headquarters staff of 250 were laid off.

When

American Motors, Inc. sold Kelvinator Corporation to White
Consolidated Industries, Inc., 400 out of 600 employees were
fired, including many of the top executives.^ When White

^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 84.
^Fredrick W. Searby, "Control Postmerger Change,
Harvard Business Review. September-October, I969, p. 8.
^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85.
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Consolidated acquired Blaw-Knox Co., 60 of the 65 supervi
sory personnel who worked in Blaw-Knox's main office were
replaced within a year; 30 were transferred to other offices
and 30 quit, retired, or were fired.*

These examples are

extreme, and not totally representative of all mergers, but
they are the mergers which receive the most publicity and
do more than their share of instilling fear into any execu
tive who may expect his company to be involved in a merger.
Who are the executives most likely to be affected
by a merger? A survey by the Harvard Business Review showed
the chief executive officer of the acquired company was at
the top of the list.?

The survey also indicated that the

higher an individual was on the executive ladder, the more
vulnerable he became (in time of merger).

In addition, the

fear of displacement became increasingly severe as the execu
tive grew older and received a higher salary.

When a deci

sion must be made between two individuals for the same job,
the younger man has more potential for growth with the
o
company and can be retained for less money.
The consequences
for senior executives— both the strong and the weak— can be
equally serious.

Often a merger strips the protective blanket

*Wall Street Journal. "Take-Over Traumas," May 15#
1969. p. 1.
?John L. Handy, "How to Face Being Taken Over,"
Harvard Business Review. Hovember-December, I969, p. 110.
Q
Wall Street Journal. "Surplus Executives," February 14, 1967. p. 1.
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from men who have been getting by on their seniority and old
friendships,9

The fear of displacement is then magnified for

the older executive who knows that once he loses his present
job, it is difficult for him to find another one at anywhere
near his previous salary,^®
Frictions Caused bv Mergers
The executive next most vulnerable due to the merger
was the high-priced staff officer in administration, legal
services, personnel, finance, or accounting.

These functions

are usually duplicated, therefore they can be absorbed by the
acquiring c o m p a n y . A noted author on mergers and acquisi
tions states,
. . . the problems of integrating two companies that
are accustomed to being two separate entities are
always difficult, even under the best circumstances,
and may in some cases be so painful that not only is
the anticipated success of the acquisition lost, but
also the buyer's own business is seriously damaged.
As a result, many economically attractive mergers have fedlen
through because the transaction threatened the job security
of the personnel of the selling company.
"Take-over" attempts or intramural weurs between staff
departments having the same responsibilities (e.g., data
^Robert C. Albrook, "Those Boxed-In, Left-Out Vice
Presidents," Fortune. May I969, p. I05.
^^all Street Journal. "Surplus Executives," p. 1.
^^Handy, "How to Face Being Taken Over," HBR. p. 110.
^^B. R. Wakefield, "Mergers and Acquisitions," Harvard
Business Review. September-October, 1965, p. 6.
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processing• credit, public relations, or treasury) often
create displacement p r o b l e m s . A n acquired executive may
have a counterpart at the acquiring company, and quite likely
there is no need for both individuals eifter the merger.

Fre

quently, in cases inhere two individuals qualify for the same
job, one executive is promoted to a meaningless position
until some means of replacing him can be found or until he
quits out of sheer frustration.

For example, differences

in managerial style or philosophy that are not at first
apparent can undo an acquired executive.

An acquired execu

tive must face several new facts after a merger occursi
(1) he has acquired a new boss and that he exists in a new
organizational pyramid, and (2) he must meet the new owner's
demands for steady and growing return on investment.If
an executive is unable to thrive in his new environment, he
eventually will be eliminated from the company through retire
ment or resignation.
Even when the acquiring company has no intentions of
disturbing the personnel structure of the acquired company,
frictions which can reduce morale and efficiency of employees
c m occur.

The extent of these frictions can depend upon the

type of merger involvedi horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.

l^Ibid., p. 8.
^^"What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85.
^^Albrook, "Frustrations," Fortune, p. 159.

27
Where two companies have hetergeneous products and %diere
little or no physical operating consolidation is planned,
separate operating policies can be continued without change.
The result in this instance may cause little or no manage
ment friction.

Where it is important to bring the people

of both companies into close# continuing contact# differences
in personnel or management policies may quickly lead to cries
of discrimination and personnel friction. 17
Pre-Merger and Post-Merger Problems
Normally a company has a well-defined goal in mind
when looking for an acquisition# but frequently mergers
occur for the purpose of improving the operation of a deteri
orating company.

The merger negotiation usually is centered

upon immediate financial advantages that each company expects
to realize— typically# greater personal liquidity for the
sellers and an improved balance sheet or price-eamings
TO

ratio for the buyer.

But in many instances# the profound

differences between two companies in their organization#
/

style and in the personality of their leaders is often over
looked.

For example# take the case where an acquisition is

made for the sole purpose of taking excessive funds out of
the acquired company as quickly as possible; then disposing

^^Hennessy# Acquiring and Merging, p. 7.
18

Albrook, "Frustrations#" Fortune, p. 153.
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of what Is left of the company when realized profits are
exhausted.

A merger of this nature would definitely have a

deleterious effect on the morale and longevity of the acquir
ed management.
Sullen resistance and poor cooperation almost always
occur after every merger; improbable rumors spread, key execu
tives quit, and workers strike over seemingly trivial issues.
In several instances, executives have left a company because
there was a lack of preparation, time, and research associated with the merger negotiations.
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After a merger, certain

executives will resist post-merger change and challenge the
new leadership.

Those who cannot be reoriented to new organ

izational relationships are normally eliminated from the
company in some manner.
Studies by John hitching, a noted author on mergers,
indicates that an importeuit influence on the success or
failure of any type cf merger is the nature of the reporting
relationships set up between parent and acquired companies
along with the organizational responsibilities and control
systems established. 21

Experts on merging companies contend

that much of the turmoil resulting from acquisition is
caused by companies doing a poor job of evaluating the skills

^^Alan N. Schoonmaker, “Why Mergers Don't Jell,“
Personnel. September-October, I969, p. 42.
^^“What About People?" Newsweek, p. 85,
^^Kitching, “Mergers Miscarry," HBR. p. 84.
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and desires of the personnel they are acquiring.

The result

is pre-merger and post-merger problems» personnel disenchantment» and people quitting after the take-over.

22

In an acquired company where the productivity of top
management » staff» department heads» and other key personnel
is unenthusiastic» the individuals of the acquired firm are
seldom to blame.

These people have lost their incentive for

enthusiasm and high speed performance as a result of post
merger b l u n d e r s P r e - and post-merger preparation indicates
that the chances of success are dependent upon the parent
company's ability to adequately motivate the people they have
acquired.

C. M. Leighton and G. R. Tod state that the most

definite way to achieve corporate objectives after an acqui
sition is to effectively motivate the management of the new
company. 24
In most successful mergers» the acquiring company
either brings in new management or it motivates the old man
agement to introduce profitable change.

An employee of an

acquired company who has been placed under the control of an
executive of the parent company and who is told to change his
methods and policies without being previously informed about

^^all Street Journal. "Take-Over Traumas»" p. 1.
^^Robert A. Short. MergerS i H o w and When to Transact
Them. (Englewood Cliffs» N.J.; Prentice-Hall» Inc.» 19&7),
pTff?.
24

Charles M. Leighton and G. Robert Tod» "After the
Acquisitions Continuing Challenge»" Harvard Business Review.
March-April 19^9. p. 97.
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new policies will be resentful and resistant to this new
authority.

Therefore the nature of reporting relationships

set up between parent and acquired company along with organi
zational responsibility and control systems both before and
after merger negotiations, have a dominant influence on
merger success.
In a survey involving 2,815 mergers, 36 per cent of
the responding chief executives felt that insufficient infor
mation had been obtained about the acquired company* s manage
ment operations and 26 per cent indicated that they had either
ignored or minimized integration problems until the deal was
26
closed.
Therefore it is important for communication to
exist between companies negotiating a merger, from the outset
of the merger, through successful post-merger integration.
2<
^Carl Rieser, "When the Crowd Goes One Way, Litton
Goes the Other," Fortune. May I963, p. 91.
26
R. J. Bolund, "Merger Planning— How Much Weight Do
Personnel Factors Carry?" Personnel. March 1970, p. 8.

CHAPTER III
HISTORY OP LITTON INDUSTRIES, INC.
Litton Industries, Inc. is a highly diversified cor
poration having assets of approximately one billion dollars.
Litton*s products cover a wide spectrum ranging from office
equipment to shipbuilding.

It was one of the fastest grow

ing corporations during the 1960s, having gi^wn 30,000 times
since its beginning over fifteen years ago. 27
Litton was originally incorporated in November, 1953t
as Electro Dynamics Corporation. 28

Its original product was

microwave tubes, but in the four years after 1953» Litton
acquired 10 electronics companies.All Litton*s initial
mergers were with small, little-known companies, some of
vdiich were insolvent at the time of acquisition.In 1958,
Litton reached a respectable sise for an electronics firm
but its sales were not large enough to classify it as a large

^^"What Happened at Litton?" Newsweek. February 12,
1968, p. 72.
28

John Sherman Porter, Ed., Moody*s Industrial Manu
al— American and Foreign. (New York; D. B. McCriden, 196?)
p. 3074.
^Rieser, "Crowd Goes One Way," Fortune. p. 115.
^^illiam B. Harris, "Litton Shoots for the Moon,"
Fortune. April 1958, p. 115.
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corporation.

In 1958• Litton initiated an acquisition policy

which eventually included over 50 companies and over $1 bil
lion in assets.
The first major diversification for Litton was the
acquisition of the Monroe Calculation Machine Company in
1958.^^ The acquisition of Monroe more than doubled the
size of Litton and from the Monroe acquisition# Litton went
on to acquire firms of various size and diversified into
numerous different fields.

The major acquisitions of Litton

are listed and discussed in Chapters IV and V.
The extent of Litton*s diversification is best
described by explaining the structure under which Litton
and its subsidiaries operate.

Litton is divided into vari

ous business groups# some of which are further subdivided
into divisions.

The Business Equipment Group# the Systems

Group# the Professional Services and Equipment Group# the
Components Group# and the Industrial Transportation Systems
Group are the major divisions of L i t t o n . T h e organiza
tional structure of Litton is illustrated in Figure 1.
Growth Record of Litton
Industries. Inc.
Litton Industries# Inc. sustained a remarkable growth
record for the first fourteen years of its existence.

Table 4

illustrates Litton's growth by showing sales# net income# and

^^Porter# Moody's Industrial Manual, p. 2650.

Chairman
President

Business Equipment
Group
Business Machines

Systems
Group

Professional Services
and Equipment Group

Components
Group

Industrial
Transportation
Group

Western Geophysical
Ingals Shipbuilding

Office Furnishing

Aero Service
Wilson Marine

Identification

w
w

Hellige
Hewitt-Robins

Eureka-Carlisle

Atherton

Specialty Paper

Profexray

Royal Typewriter

Streater

McBee

Stouffer

Advanced Data Sys

Fig. 1. The organization
of Litton Industries* Inc. as
shown in Moody *s Industrial Manual. 1968, p. 2649.
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TABXS »
COMPARATIVE GROWTH FIGURES FOR LITTON
INDUSTRIES, INC. SINCE 1955

Year

Sales
(in
Thousands}

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
i960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

8,774
14,768
27,987
82,655
124,619
187,761
250,114
393.807
553,146
686,135
915,574
1,172,233
1,778,801
1,855,007
2,176,600
2,404,300
2,446,100

Sales
(in
Thousands)
436
1,019
1,806
3,702
5,975
7,454
10,158
16,315
23,296
29,767
39,752
55,614
83,199
58,456
82,258
68,751
50,003

Earnings
Per Share
.44
.97
1.51
2.13
3.24*
1.76**
2.77**
2.84
2.70**
3.13
2.42
2.46**
2.63
1.80
2.26
1.81
1.27

Assets
7,647
10,826
16,823
57,750
83,254
119,004
172,771
269,491
354,945
423,697
630,023
742,535
1,088,351
1,207,876
1,580,306
1,934,012
1,976,038

SOURCEI John Sherman Porter, Ed., Moodv's Industrial
Manual— American and Foreign (New York» D. B. McCriden,
1955 through 1971).
*After special income tax credit.
♦♦Adjusted for 2 for 1 stock split i960» I963» 19661
also 2 for 1/2 per cent stock dividend in I96I.
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assets from 1955 to 1971.

Earnings per share for each year

is listed in order to demonstrate Litton's profitability
during that time period.

It should be noted that 2 for 1

stock splits occurred in i960, 1963, and I966, and since
1961 over $100 million in stock dividends was declared.
These stock dividends must be taken into consideration when
considering the earnings per share data in Table 4.
The increase in sales and profits by Litton during
the 1960s was accompanied by a relatively high price/eamings
ratio (Table 5).

The feasibility of any acquisition program

(other than the relatively rare cash acquisition) depends
primarily upon the maintenance of a high price/eamings ratio
that will allow the buyer to offer a premium to the seller
and still realize an increase in earnings per share through
the acquisition.^^ As compared to other conglomerates and
some single-industry companies, Litton was able to maintain
a high price/eamings ratio during the merger active years
from 1964 to 1966.
In 1968, Litton experienced its first slowdown in
profit growth.

Although sales were up by $76 million, pro

fits and eamings per share were down considerably.

Litton

blamed the slowdown in profitability on the Business Equip
ment Group which experienced delays, strikes, and lower than

33lbid., p. 3064.
Boulde
_
James B. Boulden,
"Merger
Negotiations: A Decision
Model," Business Horizons. February 19%, p. 22.

TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE PRICEAaRNINGS RATIO HISTORY
OF CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES 1964-1968
High-Low

High-Low

High-Low

High-Low

High-Low

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Litton

28-24

30-23

33-29

41-32

42-39

Walter Kidde

26-23

26-21

28-22

22-21

21-20

I.T.T,

21-20

20-18

20-18

23-20

23-22

Gulf We stem

15-14

14-12

14-11

14-12

16-13

Indian Head

14-13

13-11

11- 8

16— 8

17-16

Ogden

13-11

11-10

12- 9

19-10

22-20

Textron

13-11

15-13

17-15

23-17

24-23

9— 8

15-10

16-11

15-11

14-13

Company

Ling-Temco-Vought
SOURCE I

Fortune. November 1969, p. 152.

NOTE I Prlce/Bamlngs Ratio>i The msurket price of a stock divided by its latest
available or estimated eamings per share.
Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, conglomerates do not in general
have especially high price-eamings ratios. Of the p/e's presented here, only Litton
has had a consistently high multiple, and even its figures have been lower than those
of many single-industry conipanies.

w
o\
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expected sales.

Corporate officers at the time felt the

prospects for the future were very good once the slump in
business activity was overcome and the impact of the depeirture of several key executives overcome.Even if Litton .
experienced a slowdown in growth, the fact remained that dur
ing the years 1958-1968, Litton was very active in acquiring
and merging with other companies.

Litton's acquisitions

during the 1960s provide a basis for the study of the effects
of mergers upon management personnel and a background against
which fear of displacement, management friction, and execu
tive motivation have been examined.
Policies of Litton Industries, Inc.
tn Relation to Management
Litton's policy concerning corporate growth involved
the acquisition of companies with special expertise as a
means of attaining profitability in a new field.

Litton

followed the same policy for its retention of executives.
In a policy statement made in 1966, Litton listed three rules
that it followed when considering an acquisition.

These rules

wereI (1) the company must fit with Litton's product planning
and market planning, (2) the company must have strong manage
ment, and, (3) the initial capital outlay, potential return

^^"What Happened at Litton?" Newsweek, February 12,
1968, p. 77.
^^"Littoni B-School for Conglomerates," Business
Week. December 2, 196?, p. 88.
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on investment and other financial criteria must be right.
The order in which management is listed in the above rules
indicated the importance that Litton places on competent
management in an acquisition that it undertook. The acqui
sition policy seemed to be directly related to Litton's
concept of conglomerate management.

Therefore, Litton's

management concept was based upon the idea that talented
general managers, applying modern management techniques,
could effectively oversee diverse businesses in which they
had no specific experience.^®
Litton's acquisition policies required strong manage
ment as a criterion for any diverse acquisition, resulting
in less specific experience being required of the general
management which would oversee the new acquisition.

This

policy held true, of course, if the strong management of the
company being acquired was given enough authority to continue
the efficient operation of the subsidiary.

The ex-president

of Litton, Charles Ash, viewed Litton as a collection of
related small companies rather than as one large company^
He considered Litton to be a number of independent $10 million
to $100 million companies rather than a one billion dollar
company.

3?Jack B. Weiner, "The Management of Litton Indus
tries," Dun's Review and Modem Industry. May 1966, p. 35.
^®William S. Rukeyser, "Litton Down to Barth,"
Fortune » April 1968, p. 186.
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Within the network of decentralized divisions, Litton
measured its manager's efficiency by their return on gross
assets.

Depreciation was not considered, and the managers

were charged with the cost of their machines.

Litton's mea

sure of efficiency encouraged managers to keep production
equipment only as long as it was economically advantageous
to do so.

Using return on gross assets as a measure of

efficiency aleo encouraged the managers to return any un
necessary cash.

Litton's main controls consisted of a finan

cial plan which was presented yearly to the general management
and division heads and updated quarterly.

A return on gross

assets report, opportunity identification meetings, monthly
statements, and weekly statements of cash flow positions were
also utilized as part of the control system.

Litton's ex

president Charles Ash statedt
When you have information flowing, the problem of
exerting control takes care of itself. You have
to step in when changes have to be made. Control
shouldn't mean domination or imposition. If you
have good flow of information, control tends to be
part and parcel of communication. 39
The organization of Litton then, combined centralization
where major investment decisions were concerned with decen
tralization in day-to-day operations.

In addition, Litton's

management wanted its people to submit all the ideas they had,
trying to maintain an atmosphere of easy flow of information.
39Reiser, "Crowd Goes One Way," Fortune. p. 226.

ko
but eliminating those ideas which martagement determined nonfeasible.^®

"How Litton Keaps It Up," Fortune. September 1966,
p. 182.

CHAPTER IV
HORIZONTAIAEHTICAL

mergers of

LITTON

INDUSTRIES. INC. FROM 1958 TO 1968
Litton's first wave of acquisitions was composed of
small electronic firms mdiich specialized in particular seg
ments of this greatly expanding industry.

In Litton's early

years, the common criterion among the companies acquired
appeared to be the presence of an advanced technology that
might be applied for commercial purposes.

Most of the com

panies acquired during Litton's first five years were small
electronic firms selling primarily to the military.^
Chapter IV consists of an examination of the horizon
tal and vertical mergers of Litton from 1958 to I968. In
addition, there is a breakdown on the disposition of the top
executives after each merger.

Since horizontal/vertical

mergers have different characteristics than would be the case
with mergers of a conglomerate nature, each horizontal/vertical
merger is considered separately in Chapter IV to point out com
mon characteristics and trends.

The following companies are

the horizontal/vertical acquisitions made by Litton in chrono
logical order.

Federal Trade Commission. Economic Report On Corpor
ate Mergers. I969, p. 562.
7
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Maryland Electronic Manufacturing
Corporation (MEMC)
The BŒMC was acquired in 1958 and was a horizontal
merger since Litton was still primarily a producer of elec
tronic equipment.
350 employees.

The MEMC was not very large, having only

The total number of executives was nine,

including the purchasing agent, the chief engineer, and the
production manager.

Of the original nine executives of the

MEMC in late 1958, only the president, William R. Mase, still
remained with Litton in 1961.^ The MEMC merger did involve
a significant change in personnel within two years after the
merger. The fact that the president remained does indicate
that he was either considered a competent manager by Litton
or he retained a significant financial interest to warrant
his retention.

The retention of the president in the MEMC

merger contrasts with other mergers where the chief execu
tive is the first to be replaced.
Westrex Corporation
Litton acquired the Westrex Corporation in 1958.^
The acquisition of Westrex is considered a horisontsd merger
since Westrex*s products would be grouped generally into
2
Standard and Poor's Corporation, Poor's Register of
Directors and Executives. (New York: Standard and Poor's,
1958), p. 85^» hereinafter abbreviated Poor's Register.
^Ibid., 1961, p. k05.
4
Porter, Moodv's Industrial Manual, p. I392.
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electronic products.

However, the fact that Westrex produced

sound recording equipment, sound reproducing equipment, and
communication equipment made the Westrex merger more of a
diversification than was the case with the MSMC merger.
Westrex eventucdly becsme a division of the Professional
Services and Equipment Group rather than the Systems Group.
Litton's policy regarding top management was basically as
with the MEMC merger; by I96I, only one of Westrex*s top
executives, the vice-president, remained with the company.^
Poly Scientific Corporation (PSC)
The PSC was acquired in 1962 and was a small company
with sales of $2-$3 million and 320 employees.* The PSC
acquisition is a horizontal merger in which the executives
of the company appeared to be completely replaced.

Of the

eight executives of the company listed in 1962, none held
positions important enough in 1964 to be listed in Poor's
Register.
Winchester Electsnics.
Incorporated (WE)
Winchester Electronics was acquired in I963 and is
a horizontal merger.

The company produced electrical connec!

tors and component parts, had annual sales of $3-$6 million,
and employed 455 personnel.? The WE company later became

^Poor's Register. I96I, p. 3094.
*Ibld., 1962, p. 1276.
?Ibld., 1963, p. 1598.
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part of the Components Group of Litton. 8 Again there was
a significant change in the personnel structure among the
top executives.

Of the eight executives listed in I963»

only the chief engineer remained with the company in 1965.*
Adler Electronics Incorporated (AE)
Adler Electronics was also acquired in I963 and is
a horizontal merger, although it was diverse to some extent.
Adler Electronics produced communications equipment and was
later incorporated into the Systems Group of Litton.

Adler

Electronics was a large company, having sales of over $35
million.Although AE was reorganized to a large extent,
quite a few of the executives remained with Litton in what
appears to be equivalent or higher positions than held before
the merger.
Of the top six executives, including the president,
vice-president, and the controller, only the vice-president
for planning, Harry Adler, was no longer listed as being
with Litton in I965. Of the remaining executives, including
the director of administrative services and the personnel
manager, only one remained.Although there were no signi
ficant changes among the top executives of the AE company,
there were changes involving jobs which were easily affected

^Moodv’s, 1968, p. 2649.
^Poor's Register. I965, p. 1659.
p. 2875.

lllbid.
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by centralization with the parent company (e.g., an existing
personnel manager at Litton absorbing his counterpart in the
Adler company).
/

Clifton Precision Products
Company (GPP)
The CCP company was acquired in late 19&3 and is
another horizontal merger.

The CCP company produced servo

mechanisms and other types of electronic equipment and had
annual sales of between $9 and $12 million.

After the mer

ger, the personnel structure of the company was significantly
altered.

In 19^5, only one of the originsü. six executives

listed in 1963 remained with the company.

The remaining

executive was the vice-president of sales, Thomas W. Shoop. 12
Fitchburg Paper Company (FP)
The FP company, acquired in 1964, was involved in
specialty printing, and had annual sales of $15*$25 million
and hired 650 employees.Although the FP company was
diverse from Litton" s main line of business, it was similar
to the Eureka Specialty Printing Company and the Times Fac
simile Corporation, both subsidiaries of Litton at the time
of the merger.

After the merger, Litton retained most of

the executives of the FP company.

Of the fourteen executives

listed in 1964, only the chairman, George R. Wallace, and the

12poor"s Register, I963, p. 2875.
1964, p, 580.
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vice-president for purchasing» Vernon C. Davis, were no
longer with the Litton corporation in 1966.^*
Alvev-Ferguson Comoanv fA-F)
Th% A-F Company was a producer of conveyor systems
employing 250 personnel.The merger occurred in I966 and
is a horizontal merger since it involved a product similar
to that produced by the Hewitt-Robins company of the Indus
trial Transportation Systems Group.

In the A-P Company

merger, the executives of the acquired comps^ were almost
entirely replaced by Litton.

In I968, only two out of the

original ten executives listed in I966 were still with
Litton.
Maverick-Clark Company (M-C)
The M-C Company merger also occurred in I966 and was
another example of a horizontal merger.

Maverick-Clark pro

duced office equipment, office supplies, and did specialty
18
printing and lithography.
Only four executives were listed
with the company in 1966, and by I968 none were listed with
the Litton Corporation.

The M-C merger is another example

1966, p. 598.
, p. 48.
l*Moodv's. 1968, p. 2649.
^Tpoor's Register. 1968, p. 2581.
^®Ibid., 1966, p. 1003.
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of the personnel of an acquired company being totally dis
placed by a parent company.
Electra Motors. Incorporated (EM)

The EM merger occurred in I966 and was a vertical
merger because Electra produced electric motors, generators,
gear reducers, and fluid couplings which are used by various
components of the Industrial Transportation Group at Litton.
The EM company had 350 employees and annual sales of $6-$9
million.

The EM merger, like the Maverick-Clark merger,

resulted in the displacement of the top executives.

After

the EM merger, none of the seven executives listed in I965
held a position in I968 to be listed in Poor's Register.
McCray Refrigerator Company
The McCray Company was a producer of meat, dairy, and

produce cases, freezer cases, walk-in coolers, and reach-in
refrigerators.

20

The McCray Company was involved in the same

general type of business as Streater Industries, Inc. and

with regards to this similarity, can be considered a horizontal merger.

21

Here again, after only two years, most of the

executives disappeared after the merger.
of the executives listed in

In

I968, only one

I966 was still with the company—

the president, J. W. Krall.^^

p. 503.

^°Ibid., p. 1009.

Z^lbid., 1968, p. 2* 75.

^^Ibid.
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Sturgis Business Forms. Inc.
The Sturgis company was the last acquisition by
Litton in I966 and is considered a vertical merger.

Sturgis,

Inc. produced Isales books and autographic register forms and
tab forms.

The business of Sturgis is considered vertical

because it is more of a supplier to the divisions of the
Business Equipment Group at Litton than a producer of a like
product.

Although there were some additions to the list of

executives in 1968, only one of the I966 executives was no
longer listed with Litton.
Kester Solder Company (KS)
The KS Company was acquired in I967 and could best
be described as vertical in nature. In the KS merger there
was a 50 per cent displacement of executives between I967
and 1969. The president, a vice-president, the secretary,
the controller, and one of the plant managers had been re
placed by 1969.^*
Chainvevor Corporation
The Chainveyor company was a producer of conveyor
systems and the merger with Litton in I967 was of the hori
zontal type since Hewitt-Robins was already producing this
type of product.

Chainveyor had annusd sales of $l-$3 million

and employed 100 personnel.Unlike many other horizontal
Z^Ibld., p. 1968.

I969, p. 920.

^^Poor*8 Register. I969, p. 379.
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mergers by Litton» there was not a significant change in
personnel after the merger.

Of the ten executives listed

in 1967, only the chairman» John B. Haven» was no longer
with the company in I969.
'

Summary

As pointed out in Chapter IV» after the Litton (of
California) acquisition brought in the magnetron tube for
radar and microwave » Litton purchased firms in the "compon
ent group" producing electronic terminals» transformers »
color TV tubes» coils and transformers» and electron tubes.
In the ensuing years» further acquisitions were made of
companies producing slip rings» electronic connectors»
synchros and servomotors.^?

In addition» Chapter IV has

presented information concerning the disposition of manage
ment personnel in the horizontal and vertical mergers accom
plished by Litton since 1958.
The percentage loss of personnel for the mergers
discussed in the chapter is summarized in Table 6.

By exam

ining Table 6» it can be seen that the loss of personnel for
horizontal/vertical mergers is high.

In nine of the examples»

the personnel change exceeded 80 per cent.

It is evident

2*Ibld., p. 379.
^Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, I969» p. 562.
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE LOSS OF PERSONNEL FOR HORIZONTAL/
VERTICAL TYPE MERGERS
No. of
Executives
Retained

% Loss of
Personnel

9

1

b9

14

1

93

Poly Scientific Co.

8

0

100

Winchester Electronics

a

1

87

Adler Electronics

12

6

50

Clifton Precision
Products

6

1

83

Fitchburg Paper Co.

14

12

8

Electra Motors Co.

8

0

100

Alvey-Ferguson Co.

10

2

80

Maverick Clark Co.

4

0

100

10

1

90

5

4

20

Kester Solder Co.

10

5

50

Chainveyor Corp.

10

9

10

Company Acquired
Maryland Electronics
Westrex Corp.

McCray Refrigerator
Sturgis Newport Busi
ness Forms

No. of
Executives
Listed

CHAPTER V
DIVERSE MERGERS OF LITTON
INDUSTRIES. INC.
PROM 1958-1968
Litton'8 initial goal wsts to achieve a position in
advanced electronics so that it could participate in mili
tary and civilian electronic markets.

As indicated in

Chapter IV, Litton endeavored to bring together companies
engaged in technical operations in military electronics with
a view to extending its operations to civilian markets.

It

was shown in Chapter IV that while Litton's acquisitions
were still characterized by technological considerations, an
increasing number had no cohesive relationship to Litton's
traditional operations.^
The more important diverse or conglomerate mergers
made by Litton from 1958 to I968 are examined as the vertical/
horizontal were in Chapter IV.

The diverse acquisitions made

by Litton in chronological order are included below.
Monroe Calculating Machine Co.
In 1958 Litton diversified into the business equip
ment field by acquiring the Monroe Calculating Machine
1
Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on
Mergers. 1969# p. 559.
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Company.

The Monroe acquisition was quite a significant

merger for Litton since Monroe was larger than Litton at the
time of the merger,

Monroe*s products were calculating,

addition, account, and data processing machines. 2
At the time of the merger, Litton was producing
/

military computers and, as a result, had devised products
that seemed adaptable to civilian markets. Monroe appeared
to be an excellent vehicle for the marketing of these pro
ducts; Monroe turned to Litton because it was lagging behind
in the industry and wanted Litton as a source of new products
and ideas.^
Litton*s policy toward Monroe's executives was to
incorporate them into top executive positions at Litton
while they remained in management positions at Monroe.

The

chairman of Monroe, Alfred Connable, remained chairmcm after
the merger and also became a director on the board of Litton.
The president, Fred Sullivan, retained his position and be
came a vice-president and director at Litton.

The vice-

president and controller of Monroe, William McKenna, retain
ed his position and later became the treasurer and control
ler of Litton.

By 1960 there were only two officers at or

below the vice-president level who no longer held their
positions at Monroe.
^Moody's. 1958, p. 1217.
^"Rival for the Giantst Litton Industries," Business
Week. November 23, 1957, p. 3^.
^Poor's Register. I96I, pp. 2037-2984.
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Times Facsimile Corporation
The Times Facsimile Corporation was acquired in 1959
from the New York Times Corporation.

A relatively small

company» it employed 250 and produced reproduction equip
ment and specialty printing produkts.^ None of the five
executives listed in Poor's Register before the merger were
still employed by Times Facsimile in I96I,
of these changes can be explained.

However» three

The chairman of Times

Facsimile in 1959» Arthur Sulzberger» was also the chairman
of the New York Times Corporation.

The president» Orvil

Dryf008 » was also president and director of the New York
Times» and the treasurer» Francis Cox» was also the trea
surer of the New York Times.^

As could be expected» all

three executives remained with the parent company» the New
York Times.

*
Cole Steel Equipment Company

The Cole Steel Company was acquired in I96I.

At the

time of its acquisition it had sales in the $9-$12 million
range and produced office furniture and equipment. ^ The
company was eventually incorporated into the Office Furnish
ings Division of the Business Equipment Group.

Of the eight

officers of the company listed in I96I» six of them remained

^Poor's Register. 1958, p. 1082.
*Ibid., 1961, pp. 2240-2982.
fibid., p. 322.
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with the company by 1963•

Only, the secretary, Sidney Gelder,

and the personnel director, Arthur Dale, were no longer with
Û

the company.

In the case of the personnel director, his

position was an ideal candidate for centralization and that
accomplishment explains why he was displaced.
\

Eureka Specialty Printing Company
The Eureka Company was also acquired in 1961, and
was relatively diverse in nature.

The company employed 900

personnel and produced poster and trading stamps, seals,
coupons, gummed paper, safety paper, and stationery supplies.
Annual sales for the company were in the $15-$25 million
range.

Poor's Register listed thirteen executives with the

company in 1961, and by 1963, all but three remained with
the company.^ The secretary and treasurer, James W. Reid,
the purchasing agent, Lorenz Zeidler, and the chief engineer,
T. E. Bradley were the three executives no longer with the
company in 1963.^^
Aero Service Corporation
The Aero Service Corporation was acquired in I96I and
represents the first major component of what is now the Pro
fessional Services and Equipment Group at L i t t o n . A e r o
Service was primarily involved in aerial photography and map
making.

The Aero merger is classed as a diverse acquisition

p. 368.
^^Moodv’s. 1968, p. 2649.

p. 452.

l°Ibld., p. 453.

55

since Litton had nothing similar to this type of business
prior to the merger.

The basic personnel structure of the

company did not change after the merger except that the
chairman and president, Virgil Kaufman, was no longer with
12

the company in I963.

The position of chairman was taken

by the executive vice-president, George Strawbridge, and the
position of president was assumed by the vice-president for
marketing, Thomas O'Malley.

Other changes occurred, but

these changes only involved the shifting of personnel between
various jobs.
Ingals Shipbuilding Corporation
The Ingals merger occurred in I96I and represented
a diversification into a completely different type market.
Ingals became a major division of the Industrial Transporta
tion Systems Group and has become a major producer of both
defense and industrial shipping.Litton considered Ingals
to be well managed and by I963 there had been no change in
the officers or directors of the company.
McKieman-Terrv Corporation
The McKieman-Terry acquisition occurred in I962. At
the time of the merger, McKieman-Terry produced material
handling and marine equipment, pile hammers, hydraulics, and

^^Poor's Register. I963, p. 3I.
^^Moody's. 1968, p. 2649.
^^Poor's Register, I963, p. 738.
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gate and bridge operating machinery.

After the merger»

however» Litton changed the structure of the company to some
extent and by 1963» McKieman-Terry was also producing radar
and sonar electro-mechanical actuators » aircraft catapults
and arresting engines » and nuclear service devices.

There

was also a large change in the personnel structure after the
merger.

Litton reduced the number of top executives in the

McKieman-Terry Corporation from thirteen executives to five
executives.

In addition» R. W. McFall and W. £. McKenna»

both of whom were officers of Litton before the merger» be
came officers of McKiernan-Terry.
The introduction of McFall and McKenna into the
McKieman management hierarchy is the first example of the
placement of Litton officers into positions in an acquired
company in which the officers have had no experience.

The

personnel that remained included the more important of the
officers before the merger.

The chairman of the board, the

president, and three of the vice-presidents made up the five
surviving executives.
Streater Industries. Inc.
Streater Industries was acquired in 1964.

The com

pany produced store fixtures and had recorded sales of $9-$12
million and employed 6OO personnel. 17

^^Ibid.» p. 868.

The merger was a

l^Poor's Register. I963» p. 925.

1964, p. 1450.
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diverse acquisition although it fit well into the Business
Equipment Group.

As was Litton*s policy in previous diverse

acquisitions, the personnel structure of the company remain
ed virtually the same as before the merger.

As late as I967,

the executives of Streater Industries were the same as they
were in 1964,
;
Roval-McBee Corporation
Royal-McBee was acquired in I965 and was Litton's
first entry into the typewriter market.

The company was

renamed Royal Typewriter Company, Inc. and was reorganized
to some extent.

The president of Royal-McBee was replaced,

although he remained a director, and William McKenna, an
officer of both Monroe and Litton, became the president of
Royal.

Since Monroe was a producer of business machines,

this was probably not inconsistent with his experience, con
sidering the level of his job.
Three other officers were replaced and several new
positions added by Litton.

Seven of the original eleven

officers retained their positions or were promoted after the
IQ
merger. ^ The retention of most of the Royal-McBee execu
tives indicates that Litton felt it bought a well managed
compcmy and attempted to improve it by adding one of their
own highly regarded managers.

1967, p. l‘»98.

19Ibid., 1966. p. 1357.
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The organizational changes in the Royal-KcBee Cor
poration were made because the company was not organized
into profit centers in accordance with Litton*s policies.

20

Before the merger# the company was divided into functional
divisions.

For example# there was a marketing division and

a foreign sales division,

McKenna divisionalized the company

into "natural** divisions# giving etch division manager inter
national responsibility for his division.

The natural divi

sions were reorganized according to product instead of
function.

Basically# the changes that were made were struc

tural changes# and the Royal-McBee personnel were utilized
in the new positions.

21

The reorganization could not be

considered a large scale reduction of personnel.
Hewitt-Robins Incorporated (H-R)
Hewitt-Robins was acquired in 1965*

The H-R company

produced conveyer systems# a product which was completely
diverse from anything Litton was producing at the time.

In

the H-R merger# as was the case in most other diverse acqui
sitions# the top executives were virtually left alone after
the merger.

Because Litton had no experience with conveyer

systems# strong management was a prerequisite for the merger.
As was the case with Monroe# some of the executives of Hewitt20

Jack B. Weiner# "The Management of Litton Indus
tries," Dun*s Review and Modem Industry. May 1966# pp. 32-33.

Zllbid., p. 53.
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Robins were made officers of Litton.
made officers of Litton.
and Austin Goodyear.

These executives were

These executives were Ellis Gardner

22

The H-R merger actually took place because of a
threat from a Hewitt-Robins stockholder of gaining control
of the company and changing the^ policies and goals then pur
sued by H-R management.

Austin Goodyear» president of Hewitt-

Robins» called officials of Litton to ask if they were inter
ested in a merger,

Litton decided almost immediately that

they were» and within a very short time period» Litton had
made most of the plans for accomplishing the merger.

Hewitt-

Robins was satisfied with the deal because Litton*s policies
concerning grovrth were along the same lines as their own
policies at the time.^^
Stouffer Foods Corporation
Stouffer Foods was acquired by Litton in I967 and was
engaged in preparing» selling» and serving cooked food through
a chain of restaurants and motels emd through retail outlets.
In addition» Stouffer was engaged in the food management business.

2 ii

The Stouffer Foods merger is another example of a

^^Poor's Register. I967. p. 935.
"Anatomy of an Acquisition»" Dun's Review and Modern
Industry» May i960» pp. 65-68.
oil

standard.and Poor's Corporation» Standard Corpora
tion Descriptions, (Vol. 29» No. 13» New York# Standard and
Poor's Corporation» Publishers» April-May I968)» p. 7505.
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diverse merger and there was no change in the personnel make
up of the company from before the merger in I967 to 1970.
The chairman of the board and president# Vernon Stouffer#
also became a director of Litton.
Litton was particularly interested in the management
food service division and the frozen prepared food division
of Stouffer.

They were interested in combining the various

food divisions with the^r microwave oven# which was being
produced by the Atherton Division of the Professional Serv26 '
ices and Equipment Group.
Eureka X-Rav Tube Corporation
The Eureka company was also acquired in I967 and was
incorporated into the Professional Services and Equipment
Group.

At the time of the merger# Eureka*s sales were at

the $l-$3 million msurk and employment was approximately 90
p e o p l e . U p to 1970, there were no changes in the execu28
tive structure of the Eureka company.
Summarv
The diverse mergers executed by Litton Industries
from 1958 to 1968 have been discussed in this chapter.

As

indicated by these mergers# Litton in the latter part of the

^^Poor's Register. I969, p. 753*
^^Moodv*s. 1968# p. 2649.
^^Poor's Register. I967, p. 452.
^®Ibld., 1969, p. 601.
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1950e endeavored to move into the business machines and
equipment industry.

During the same period, to complement

its electronic activities, Litton undertook the acquisition
of firms in the field of professional services and equip
ment.

The next stage in its acquisition program was obtain

ing larger firms in the heavy industry field.

Most recently,

Litton has moved into the educational systems fields, while
continuing its acquisition program in industrial systems
and equipment. 29
^
The same criteria used in examining the horizontal/
vertical mergers listed in Chapter IV was used in the exami
nation of the mergers in Chapter V.

However, as illustrated

in Table 7, the percentage loss of personnel for the diverse
mergers is different.

The percentage change in personnel

among top executives is smsill as compaured to the changes
associated with the horizontal/vertical mergers.

In the

acquisitions examined, only one resulted in a personnel loss
of 80 per cent or more.

A logical explanation can be given

for this one high displacement percentage.

A majority of the

officers of the Times Facsimile Corporation were also officers
of the parent company, the New York Times.

Therefore they

would not have been expected to retain their positions with
the Times Facsimile Corporation under the circumstances.
In addition, several of the diverse acquisitions
illustrate Litton*s merger policy of obtaining well managed
20
^Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on
Mergers. 1969, p. 559.
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE LOSS OF PERSONNEL FOR
DIVERSE TYPE MERGERS

Company Acquired
Monroe Calculating
Machine Co.

No. of
Executives
Listed

No. of
Executives
Retained

% Loss of
Personnel

13

11

11

0

100
(40)#

8

6

25

Eureka Specialty
Printing Co.

13

10

23

Aero Service Corp.

16

15

6

Ingals Shipbuild
ing Co.

12

12

0

McKieman-Terry Co.

13

5

61

7

7

0

Royal-McBee Corp.

11

7

6

Hewitt-Robbins Co.

4

4

0

Stouffer Foods Co.

17

17

0

6

6

0

Times Facsimile Co.
Cole Steel Equip
ment Co.

Streater Indus
tries, Inc.

Eureka X-Ray Tube Co.

♦Three of the five top executives of the Times Fac
simile Co. were also high officers with the parent company,
the New York Times Corporation. They remained with the New
York Times Corporation and are not considered displaced by
the merger.
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companies.

For example, the Litton/^onroe merger seems to

have followed the rules set forth by Litton concerning
merger negotiations.

Litton thought that Monroe was well

managed as pointed out by the fact that practically all of
its officers at Monroe retained their positions, and some
even became officers at Litton.

According to Mace and

Montgomery, authors of Management Problems of Corporate
Acquisitions, a majority of Litton*s diverse mergers are
those in which the company being acquired possessed strong
management talent which the acquiring company felt would
help strengthen the parent company.

^^Mace and Montgomery, Management Problems, p. 9.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter I was devoted to examining the background of
merger activity in the United States and discussing the
three major merger typest (1) horizontal, (2) vertical, and
(3) conglomerate or diverse.

As stated in Chapter I, the

purpose of this paper was to study the impact of mergers on
executive displacement.

In addition, three basic questions

(see page 14) concerning executive displacement were asked.
Two of these questions were general in nature, while the
other one pertains specifically to the mergers of Litton
Industries, Inc.

Chapter VI restates these three questions

and draws conclusions based on the research involved in
examining the mergers and acquisitions of Litton Industries.
Chapter II was devoted to answering the question of
what problems could be expected with respect to the utiliza
tion and retention of personnel when a merger or acquisition
was considered.

The basic problems found were: (1) fear of

displacement on the part of the executives of the businesses
being acquired, (2) friction between executives of the parent
company and the company being acquired, and (3) the motiva
tion of the executive before and after the merger had occur
red.
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Chapter III contained a general background of Litton
Industries and description of Litton*s' general policies
toward management.

The background information on Litton*s

growth and management policies during the 1960s was used to
analyse the mergers executed by Litton in Chapter IV and V.
The mergers of Litton from 1958 to I968 were examined in
Chapters IV and V in order to determine what happened to
the top executives after a merger occurred.

The horizontal

and vertical mergers were considered to be one basic cate
gory and were listed in Chapter IV.

Chapter V contained the

diverse or conglomerate mergers executed by Litton in the
same time period.

^
Personnel Problems

In considering the first question (personnel problens associated with mergers) the basic problems were re
stated and conclusions were drawn based on information obtain
ed from analyzing the mergers of Litton.

Also» some "text

book" opinions which have been offered concerning the handl
ing of mergers and acquisitions were viewed and an attempt
was made to determine if Litton*s actions were consistent
with these opinions.
Fear of Displacement
Fear of displacement is difficult to measure and to
overcome.

As indicated by Litton*s mergers, Litton estab

lished a reputation of acquiring well managed companies and
leaving the personnel structures intact sifter the merger.
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Litton*8 non-displacement policy was the case in many of the
mergers studied, although there were several exceptions among
the smaller, earlier mergers.

Of the mergers examined, there

was no evidence of large sccde displacement of personnel that
would create executive fear as was the case of Pedders Corpor
ation's acquisition of Norge or White Consolidated*s acquisi
tion of Kelvinator and Blaw-Knox.^
Management Friction
The problem of friction among personnel when two com
panies are suddenly merged is one of the more serious problems
associated with merger activity.

Where two companies have

hetergeneous products and where little or no physical or oper
ating consolidation is planned, separate corporate policies
2
can be continued without change.
In addition, executives of
acquired companies with direct line responsibilities are less
subject to displacement than executives in staff capacities.
For example, the sales manager and the manufacturing manager
are less likely to be displaced than their financial, legal,
or public relations counterparts.

The reason is simply that

the operating executives are needed to run the organization
while the staff functions may very readily be absorbed into
the existing staff of the parent company.^

^"But What About People?" Newsweek, p. 84.
^ennessy. Acquiring and Merging, p. 228.
^ytmar, "Merger and Executive," Business Horizons.

p. 51.
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Where it is important to bring the people of both
companies into close continuing contact after a merger# dif
ferences in personnel or management policies often lead to
iL
management friction and to cries of discrimination.
In
some of Litton's earlier mergers# the acquired companies had
operations similar enough to allow Litton management to play
an increased role in their policies and operations.

As indi

cated in Table 6 (11 out of 14 mergers) the close operating
relationships resulted in a relatively high turnover of management personnel, especially those in staff positions.

In other

instances, particularly in Litton*s later mergers# the opera
tion of the acquired company was diverse enough that Litton
management did not participate significantly in the management
of the acquired company.

The low management displacement

indicated by data in Table 7 (10 out of 12 mergers) points
this finding out.
In conclusion# management friction is less severe
when the acquired company's product is diverse from the parent
company's basic purpose.

The fact that Litton's divisions

run their day to day operations with a great deal of autono
my indicates that there are usually no close controls put on
the top executives of newly acquired companies which vrould
cause Emy serious frictions.

In 81 per cent of merger fail

ures# the organizational format (either the reporting rela
tionships established after the merger or the extent of

. Hennessy, Acquiring and Merging, p. 228.
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autonomy allowed) was disturbed at least once after the mer
ger was brought about. ^ The fact that Litton made it a
policy to acquire competent management and attempted not to
disburb the established organisational pattern of their acqui
sitions, helped reduce management friction and keep their
acquisition failures to a minimum.
Pre/Post-Merger Motivation
The final personnel problem concerns the ability of
the parent company to motivate the executive before and after
the merger takes place.

As stated in Chapter II, the surest

way to achieve corporate objectives after a merger is to
effectively motivate the management of the new company.^
Even though a company may be acquired for its management
potential, improper handling of the new personnel may result
in their loss.
Although some degree of centralization is possible
in a company with as many diverse subsidiaries as Litton, a
certain degree of decentralization is necessary if each sub
sidiary is to run smoothly and efficiently.? Litton's policy
of decentralization offers responsibility to the top execu
tives of all the subsidiaries.

Litton's methods of evaluating

Pitching, "Mergers Miscarry?" HER, p. 84.
^Leighton and Tod, "Continuing Challenge," HER, p. 97.
?Joel Dean.and Winfield Smith, "The Relationship
Eetween Profitability and Size," quoted in William W. Alberts
and Joel £. Segal, Ed., The Corporate Merger. (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, I967), p. 4.
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managers by the profits they produce should also motivate
the managers to produce to the utmost of their abilities.
A strong commitment to measuring managers on the basis of
the economic performances of their divisions and rewarding
them generously for good performance tends to develop an
organisational climate and compensation system that attracts
competent people and motivates them to expand and improve
o
their operations.
Many chief executives affirm the need to investigate
personnel-related factors in greater depth during the pre
merger evaluation stage.^

In a survey of 50 companies

involved in from one to ten mergers, the companies took the
following into consideration before merging or acquiring:
(1) evaluating the managers in the new organization against
the tasks to be accomplished, (2) depth of management talent,
(3) compatibility of organizational structures, and (4) how
to motivate the new executives.Since a sound decentral
ized organization is not possible unless each subsidiary has
competent management, according to Litton, the easiest method
of obtaining competent management is to ensure it is there
before the company is acquired and then ensure it is motivated
Q
Norman A. Berg, **What*8 New About Conglomerate Man
agement?" Harvard Business Review. Nov«aber-December I969,
p. 117.
"
^Bolund, "Merger Planning," Personnel, p. 8.

lOlbld.
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properly.

This management policy indicates Litton's concern

for pre-merger evaluation of potential merger candidates and
their concern for post-merger integration and continuing
motivation of their managers.
' In final conclusion, a corporation such as Litton can
effectively expand into fields in which it has no experience
if the businesses it acquires have strong management and if
the management is properly motivated.

The conclusion is based

on the fact that during the period I96O-I968, Litton*s man
agement policies at that time overcame the basic problems of
fear, friction, and motivation facing companies who attempt
to achieve growth through the acquisition of other companies.
Extent of Executive Displacement
The second question to be answered asked what the
extent of personnel changes were in the mergers accomplished
by Litton.

The amount of executive displacement was covered

in detail in Chapter IV and V and the results were summarized
in the comparative bar graphs of Table 8.

The percentage

loss of personnel from i960 to I967 was illustrated graphi
cally in Table 8.

It should be noted that in the most recent

half of the mergers examined, or those occurring since 1964,
the average per cent loss was 33 per cent.

The average prior

to 1964 was 56 per cent loss of personnel.

The percentage

loss trend indicated that as Litton grew larger and became
more diverse, its policy of seeking and retaining strong man
agement in its mergers grew stronger.
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TABLE 8

COMPARATIVE BAR GRAPHS OF PERCENTAGE
LOSS OF PERSONNEL BY MERGER TYPE
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Relationship of Merger Type
to Executive Displacement
The type of merger (horizontal, vertical, or diverse)
had a great deal to do with the ability of the acquired com
pany to exist as a separate entity from the parent company.
Thus the type of merger had a beeuring on the extent of per
sonnel displacement occurring after a merger.

The results

in the Litton, study ranged from no change at all in many of
the diverse mergers to a 100 per cent change in some of the
horizontal mergers (see Tables 6 and 7).

As can be seen,

there was a large difference between the amount of personnel
change.

In fact, the two categories (horizontal/vertical vs.

diverse) are almost opposite (see Table 8).
The difference in executive displacement can be attri
buted to the fact that it is more difficult for a company
executive to accommodate himself to a vertical or horizontal
merger than to the life in a conglomerate, since there is a
greater need for autonomy in the latter.

An integrated oper

ating company— unlike a conglomerate— is likely to have a
full usage of corporate services and controls that it will
be reluctant to see either duplicated or ignored in a new
d i v i s i o n . A s indicated by the Litton study, not until
Litton began to diversify did the need for autonomy and de
centralization lower the percentage loss of personnel.

^^Albrook, "Frustrations," Fortune. p. 162.

73
The extent to which the management tool can be
applied also depends upon the type of merger.

Litton*s

acquisition policies did not always agree with its actions.
It is seen that many of the horizontal mergers involved a
high turnover in top management personnel.

By referring to

the organization of Litton in Chapter III, it can also be
seen that most of the companies involved in these horizontal/
vertical mergers lost their identities and were integrated
completely into other divisions.

In the case of the diverse

mergers, however, Litton followed its acquisition policy in
almost every merger examined.

There was little change in

personnel structure of the companies acquired and eight out
of twelve companies retained their identities as a division
of Litton.

It can be concluded, therefore, that in the case

of the large, diverse mergers, Litton*s policies should
avoid executive displacement.

In the case of the horizontal/

vertical mergers, this conclusion cannot be made.
Acquisitions and mergers are methods of achieving
corporate growth which require, not only the taking into
account of economic forces, but the emotional factors of the
individuals involved.

Current literature on corporate mer

gers indicate that mergers are products of methodical research,
intensive operations analysis, thorou^ audits, and economic
logic. 12

In many instances, the psychological factors such

12
Boulden, "Merger Negotiationst" Business Horizons.
p. 21.
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as fear, management friction, and motivation are not realis
tically evaluated prior to and after a merger occurs.

Mer

gers and acquisitions, as reflected in this paper, take into
account the human/emotional factors which can sometimes mean
the difference between the success and failure of a merger.
In addition, as evidenced by the study of the mergers of
Litton Industries, the type of merger (horizontal, vertical,
diverse) plays an integral role on executive displacement.
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